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LABOR LAW-EDUCATIONAL

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT-LEGISLATIVE SILENCE AND THE FUNCTION OF COURTS IN TEACHERS' STRIE
INJUNCTION

SUITS--h. 288, [1975] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1227.

Although the Washington State Legislature has enacted several statutes providing for collective bargaining in public employment,' until
recently it avoided the complex issues arising out of breakdowns in
negotiations between local school boards and certificated teachers'
representatives. In 1975, after considerable debate and a number of
unsuccessful attempts,2 the legislature adopted the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA)3 defining the rights and duties of parties to collective bargaining in the education sector. The measure is a
response to the increasing militancy of teachers as a professional employee group,4 the apparent ineffectiveness of anti-strike injunctions, 5
and the lack of inducements to bargain in good faith. These factors
created the need for a more effective and comprehensive approach to
the unique problems of labor relations in public education. Unfortunately, the impasse resolution procedures outlined in the statute are an
inadequate response to the problems underlying dispute settlement in
the education sector.
This note evaluates the impasse resolution mechanism provided in
the statute and concludes that the approaches employed by the Act
1. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 41.06.010 et seq. (state employees generally);
id. § 41.56.010 et seq. (police, fire, and local employees); id. § 28B.52.010 et seq.
(community college academic employees). For a general discussion of the problems
and theories of public employee labor relations see Symposium: Labor Relations in
the Public Sector, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891 (1969).
2. See, e.g., E.S.H.B. 1341, 43d Legis., 3d Ex. Sess. (1974); S.S.B. 2322, 43d Legis.,
1st Ex. Sess. (1973); H.B. 177, 43d Legis., Reg. Sess. (1973).
3. Ch. 288, [1975] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1227. Governor Evans exercised a
partial veto as to the provision creating an educational employment relations commission (§ 4). The members of the commission were to be appointed by the governor
with the consent of the senate. Governor Evans objected to a proviso in that section
that would, in effect, have permitted the senate to reject an appointee to the commission by inaction. See Note (Governor's explanation of partial veto), id. at 1238. However, in a subsequent "mini-session," the legislature created a public employment
[labor] relations commission. Ch. 5, [1975] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 6. By virtue
of the proviso in § 3(3) of the Educational Employment Relations Act, this new commission effectively replaces the commission which would have been created by the
EERA. See ch. 288, § 3(3), [1975] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1228. Thus, the major
portions of the EERA will become effective on Jan. 1, 1976, id. § 26 at 1238, while
the legislation creating the commission has been effective since Sept. 8, 1975, ch. 5,
§ 9, [1975] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 9, and that prescribing certain of its duties
under the EERA has been effective since Sept. 30, 1975, see ch. 288, § 26, [1975]
Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1238.

186

Educational Employment Relations Act
will not substantially reduce the judicial role in resolving negotiation
impasses. The judicial role in dispute settlement will be examined,
particularly with regard to the issuance of injunctions against teachers'
strikes, either threatened or in progress. The underlying premise is
twofold: (1) school districts should be immune to strikes only when
the public health or safety are endangered; and (2) the degree of proof
requisite to support injunctive relief from a teachers' strike should
reflect such a standard.

I.

PREVALENT STATUTORY PATTERNS

Public employee bargaining statutes vary in coverage from one specific occupational group, such as teachers, to statutes which are gener4. See Note, Teachers' Strikes-A New Militancy, 43 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 367
(1968). According to the Washington State Superintendent of Public Instruction,
teachers' strikes in Washington have occurred over the last four years as follows:
Duration (days)
School District
Year
Aberdeen
1
1972
10
1973
Evergreen, Vancouver
5
Elma
Edmonds
1
I
1974
.Central Kitsap, Bremerton
6
Mead, Spokane
Goldendale
1
1
Yelm
2
Kelso
2 (court delayed school
Mukilteo
opening 2 days)
6 (court delayed school
Federal Way
opening 1 week)
Tacoma
3 school days (9 days
total)

1975

Clover Park
South Kitsap
West Valley, Yakima

12
3
10

Letters from Superintendent of Public Instruction to author, October 16, 1975, on file
at the offices of the Washington Law Review.
5. In most cases one of the conditions of settlement of the strike is an amnesty
agreement exculpating the strikers' illegal conduct. But see Mead School Dist. No. 354
v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wn. 2d 278, 534 P.2d 561 (1975) (contempt citations for
the violation of an injunction of a teachers' strike survive the subsequent invalidation
of the injunction).
The probable ineffectiveness of injunctions in teachers' strikes must also be considered by trial judges. For example, "The teachers [of the Clover Park School District] stated publicly before the matter came to court that they would not comply
with a court issued injunction and were ready to go to jail if necessary to secure justice." Letter from Judge E. Albert Morrison, Pierce County Superior Court, to author,
Sept. 22, 1975, on file at the offices of the Washington Law Review.
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ally applicable to all state employees. 6 Washington, like most other
states, has enacted separate statutes for different public employee
groups. 7 Only five states have extended a limited strike right to public
educators; 8 however, even those jurisdictions permit such action only
after statutory impasse resolution procedures have been exhausted. 9
Those jurisdictions which have not provided a limited strike right
have placed teachers in a difficult negotiating position by permitting
them to unionize and participate in collective negotiations while contemporaneously prohibiting teachers' strikes. As alternatives to the
strike power, most states have enacted statutes calling for mediation,
factfinding, arbitration, mutually-determined voluntary systems, or
some combination of these procedures, aimed at facilitating impasse
resolution.
Historically, strikes by public employees have been prohibited1 ° in
most jurisdictions either by statute" or case law.' 2 Jurisdictions which
6. See Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives: The Public Employment Experience,
63 Ky. L.J. 430, 447-48 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note].
7. See statutes cited in note I supra.
8. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (granting the right to strike to certain
semi- and nonessential public employees if not detrimental to the public health, safety.
and welfare); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1974) (permitting strikes by public
employees, including teachers, if there is no danger to the public health and safety;
strike prohibited for sixty days after factfinding report is issued); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 243.726 (1974) (granting a limited right to strike for employees for which final and
binding arbitration is not provided; injunctive relief granted where the strike presents
clear danger to the public health, safety, and welfare); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.1003 (Purdon's Supp. 1975) (authorizing strikes by public employees if there
is no clear or present danger to public health and safety and if the collective bargaining process is exhausted); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2010 (Supp. 1975) (allowing
teachers to strike unless there is a "clear and present danger to a sound program of
education").
9. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (a)(3)(c) (1972) (providing that strike
action is permitted only after employee organizations and public employers have engaged in mediation); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1974) (providing that mediation,
factfinding, and other statutory resolution procedures must have been exhausted before the strike prohibition is removed).
10. Although the prohibition of certificated teacher-employee strikes is not the
central concern of this note, a discussion of the issue is important for two reasons:
(1) injunctions of teachers' strikes have tended to follow as a matter of course once
the court has determined the strike to be illegal; and (2) the strength of the rationale
supporting the illegality of public employee strikes may influence the equitable context in which courts determine whether injunctions should be granted to avert threatened teachers' strikes. See Part Ill-B infra.
11. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10--153e (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14
§ 4011(c) (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1301 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-14
(Burns 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.12 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5423
(1972); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 979-C2 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art 77,
§ 160(l) (1975); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 150E, § 9A (Cum. Supp. 1974); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 17.455(2) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64 (Supp. 1975); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 105.530 (Vernon Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-6120 (1971);
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prohibit strikes by teachers have developed a variety of justifications
for the strike prohibition. Early cases relied on what has been labeled
the "sovereignty" doctrine, the notion that a strike by teachers constitutes, a direct affront to the government's authority. 1 3 Recent decisions, however, have disregarded the sovereignty doctrine and formulated justifications which relate more closely to protection of the
public welfare. 14 The rationale of these decisions is that disruption of
certain governmental functions impairs the public health and safety;
strikes by public employees that provide essential services are therefore intolerable. Other justifications offered in support of the teachers'
strike prohibition include claims that: (1) the lack of a profit motive
on the part of the school district results in inherently equal bargaining

relationships and makes the strike right unnecessary;1 5 (2) an extenNEB. REV. STAT. § 48-802 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.230 (1973); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 98-C: 2 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1973);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15-38.1-14.1 (1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02

(Page 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 509.8 (1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 28-9.3-1 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-18-10 (1974); VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-55 (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(b) (1959).
12. See Kirker v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.W.Va. 1970); Potts v. Hay, 229
Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958); San Diego v. AFSCME Local 127, 8 Cal. App. 3d
308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Il. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d
427 (1965); Jefferson County Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627
(Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971); Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ.
Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867 (1968); City of Alcoa v. Local 760, I.B.E.W., 203
Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957). Teachers' strikes are not expressly prohibited by
either statute or case law in Washington. See Part III infra.
13. See, e.g., Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d
482 (1951); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141
A.2d 624 (1958). The vitality of the sovereignty doctrine has diminished substantially
in recent years. Commentators have characterized the doctrine as nothing more than
a fiction, see Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis.
L. REv. 549, 555, an archaic derivation of the divine right of kings theory, see Note,
A CriticalApproach to the TraditionalProhibitionof Teacher Strikes in Connecticut:
Is the Qualified Right to Strike a Viable Alternative?, 2 CONN. L. REv. 171, 186
(1969) citing Holytz y. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1969),
and an argument which ignores the distinction between government as the sovereign
and government as an employer, see D. WOLLETT & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 6:114 n.354 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WOLLETT &
CHANIN].

14. See, e.g., City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d
206 (1968) (discussed in text accompanying notes 89-92 infra); Port of Seattle v.
ILWU, 52 Wn. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958) (discussed in text accompanying notes
49-63 infra).
15. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Community School Dist. 2 v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d
567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965). Note, however, that the lack of a profit motive on the
part of the governmental employer does not provide insurance against an unequal
bargaining relationship. The profit maximization goal in the private sector is supplanted by funding and budgetary constraints in the public sector. See Comment,
Prohibition Revisited: The Strike Ban in Public Employment, 1969 Wis. L. REV.
930, 932.
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sion of the strike right to public educators is impermissable because
school districts must negotiate within legislatively determined budgetary constraints; 16 (3) if teachers were permitted to strike, the decline
in prestige suffered by government as a result of the coercive delegation of power might undermine the school district's authority;1 7 and
(4) notable distinctions between private and public employment, such
as the absence of market mechanisms to restrict public employees'
18
demands, make granting the strike right to teachers imprudent.
II.

THE WASHINGTON SCHEME

A.

Statutory Analysis

The new statute repeals the Professional Negotiations Act 19-the
first Washington statute to specifically extend to certificated teachers
the right to "meet, confer, and negotiate" with their school boards in
order to communicate their professional judgment regarding proposed
school policy matters. The EERA extends those rights to all certificated employees of a school district and imposes the duty of good
faith bargaining at reasonable times with respect to wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment on both district directors and
16. Taylor, Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures?,20 INo. & LAB. REL. REV.
617, 619 (1967). One commentator has criticized this justification on the grounds that
potential budgetary problems could be alleviated by the passage of statutes requiring
statutory impasse procedures to be exhausted prior to strike and prescribing time limitations on the negotiations. See Note, supra note 6, at 453. See also Ch. 288, § 3(2),
[1975] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. 1228, which mandates that bargaining meetings
take place "at reasonable times in light of the time limitations of the budget-making
process ....
17. Cf. City of New York v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 243 N.E.2d 128, 295
N.Y.S.2d 901 (1968).
18. See id. at 186, 243 N.E.2d at 133-34, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 909, where the court
stated:
[T] he necessity for preventing goods or services being priced out of the market
may have a deterrent effect upon collective bargaining negotiations in the private
sector, whereas, in the public sector, the market place has no such restraining
effect upon the negotiations ....
Although the market restraints in the public sector are different from those influencing private employees, public employees are subject to various equivalent restraints:
(1) the individual striker must be able to withstand the loss of wages accompanying
the strike; (2) the potential of antagonizing the public (the "ultimate" employer)
may restrict strike activity; and (3) in certain public services there is market competition from private contractors providing the same services.
19. Ch. 223, §§ 28A.72.010 -. 090, [1969] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1911 (relating
to collective bargaining rights of school district employees holding regular teaching
certificates) (formerly WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.72.010-.090 (1974)), repealed by
ch. 288, § 28, [19751 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1238.
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teacher bargaining representatives. 20 The EERA does not define the
scope of bargaining, permitting the commission created to administer
the Act to decide disputes as to which items are mandatory subjects of
21
bargaining.
As with most state collective bargaining statutes,2 2 the substance of
the EERA is contained in the impasse resolution procedure. Central
to the operation of the Act is a three-member employment relations
commission2 3 which, among other duties, administers mediation2 4 and
factfinding with recommendations. 2 5 The parties to an agreement may
provide for binding arbitration of disputes which arise over the operation of the agreement.26 The EERA also provides for flexible procedural mechanisms allowing districts and teachers' representatives to
20. The right to collectively bargain with the school board should not be taken to
imply a concomitant right to strike. Port of Seattle v. ILWU, 52 Wn. 2d 317, 321, 324
P.2d 1099, 1102 (1958). But see Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Proj. Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954) (collective bargaining
and the strike right held to be inseparable). See also Clover Park School Dist. 400
v. Clover Park Edue. Ass'n, No. 238548 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16,
1975) (implying that unless the right of teachers to strike is expressly denied, it is
always available).
21. Ch. 288, § 3(2), [1975] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1228. The EERA does
provide, however, "Et] hat prior law, practice or interpretation shall be neither restrictive, expansive, nor determinative with respect to the scope of bargaining." Id.
22. See Lev, Strikes by Government Employees: Problems and Solutions, 57
A.B.A.J. 771 (1971).
23. The legislative evolution of the commission is discussed in note 3 supra.
24. Ch. 288, § 13(1), [1975] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1234. Mediation is generally defined as the efforts of an impartial third party to assist the negotiating parties
in reaching a voluntary settlement of the dispute. See generally Bain, Third Party
Settlements in Education, 26 ARB. J. 41 (1971); Chisholm, Mediating the Public
Employee Dispute, 12 LAB. L.J. 56 (1961); Moskowitz, Mediation of Public Employee
Disputes, 12 LAB. L.J. 54 (1961); Zack, Improving Mediation and Factfinding in the
Public Sector, 21 LAB. L.J. 259 (1970).
25. Ch. 288, § 13(2), [1975] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1234. If mediation
proves unsuccessful in effectuating settlement of the controversy, either party may
request factfinding with advisory recommendations which can be made public by any
party to the dispute if settlement is not reached within five days after the recommendations are received. Id. § 13. Presumably the potential release to the public of the
recommendations and subsequent public pressure for settlement of the dispute will
foster good faith consideration of the recommendations by the disputants.
Factfinding is generally more investigative than is mediation. The factfinder is
usually empowered to call hearings, issue subpoenas, hear oral argument, and employ
other judicial methods of discovery. Under the Act, the factfinder will hear proposals
and argument from both parties after which he or she will suggest modifications and
make recommendations as to terms of settlement. For a general discussion of factfinding in public employment see Davey, The Use of Neutrals in the Public Sector,
20 LAB. L.J. 529 (1969); Gould, Public Employment: Mediation, Factfinding and
Arbitration, 55 A.B.A.J. 835 (1969); Jossen, Factfinding: Is It Adjudication or Adjustment?, 24 ARB. J. 106 (1969); McKelvey, Fact Finding in Public Employment
Disputes: Promiseor Illusion?, 22 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 528 (1969).
26. Ch. 288, § 14, [1975] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1235.
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substitute their own mutually-determined methods of impasse resolu27
tion which will control over conflicting statutory procedures.
The practical effect of the EERA's repeal of prior law is minimized
by the similarity the new impasse mechanism bears to the old. However, one significant change has been made. Prior law provided for
nonbinding recommendations by an ad hoc committee appointed by
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. If those recommendations were rejected by either party to the dispute, statutory alternatives
were unavailable 28 and strikes often resulted. From the teachers' viewpoint, the Superintendent's interest in maintaining the continued availability of public education biased the negotiations in favor of the district. Ideally, employees should be able to participate in selecting the
neutral third parties to mediate the controversy. Under the new statute, either the district directors or the teachers' representative may
declare that an impasse has been reached and request mediation assistance from the public employment relations commission. 29 The parties have the opportunity to mutually select mediators or factfinders; if
they are unable to agree on a mediator, the commission will appoint
one. 30 Shifting the selection process to an impartial agency should do
much to eliminate teachers' fears that the mediator appointed will
have a school district bias.
B.

Shortcomings and PotentialProblems

Perhaps the most frequent criticism of settlement procedures which
rely on neutral third parties to resolve negotiation impasses is that
such procedures, particularly factfinding and arbitration, undermine
good faith bargaining in the initial stages of negotiation. 31 This result
is to be expected where the relative bargaining strength of the parties
is grossly disproportionate, where a government-appointed mediator is
unacceptable to one of the disputants because of a perceived bias, or
where prior bargaining experience indicates that there are advantages
27.
28.

Id., § 13(5).
See ch. 223, § 28A.72.060, [1969] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1913 (formerly
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.72.060 (1974)), repealed by ch. 288, § 28(5), [19751 Wash.
Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1238.
29. Ch. 288, § 13(1), [1975] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. 1234.
30.

31.

Id.

See Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 459, 467 (1971); Zack, Improving Mediation and Factfinding in the Public
Sector, 21 LAB. LJ. 259, 273 (1970).
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to be gained by pushing negotiations to the factfinding or arbitration
32
stage.
Mediation has generally been recognized as an effective means of
dispute settlement in the early stages of a controversy,33 yet many difficult substantive issues may not be resolved solely by mediation because the process is dependent entirely upon the willingness of the
bargaining agents to voluntarily resolve confficts. Anticipating the limited effectiveness of mediation, parties to the dispute may thus withhold concessions during mediation in the hope that factfinding or arbitration will result in a more favorable settlement.3 4 There is consequently a very real possibility that "factfinding may become. . . an
addictive habit, the first and not the final step in collective negotiations. 3 5 Despite its limited effectiveness, however, mediation appears
to be the most reasonable method of initiating further communication
between disputants.
Recognizing that mediation, while successful in narrowing the parties' differences and encouraging further negotiations, would be inadequate to resolve difficult bargaining questions, the Washington Legislature included factfinding as a further step in resolving negotiation
impasses. Factfinding bears a strong procedural resemblance to arbitration, but the process lacks the finality of either voluntary or compulsory arbitration.3 6 In addition, factfinding and mediation are interdependent processes, thereby clouding an assessment of the value of
each process independent of the other.3 7 For this and other reasons,
the combination of mediation and factfinding has been adopted in
38
some form in most jurisdictions.
32.

Bernstein, supra note 31, at 467, suggests that arbitration generally results in

more favorable settlements for the public employee groups. He reasons that arbitrators generally fix equitable salaries for the employees; public officials then determine
the amount of public service to be purchased at this price. However, curtailment of
services generally does not occur. Thus, Bernstein concludes that "the wage decision
and the resource allocation decision are inevitably linked." Id.
33. See Note, supra note 6, at 453; Stutz, The Resolution of Impasses in the
Public Sector, 1 URBAN LAWYER 320 (1969).
34. See Bernstein, supra note 31, at 467; Zack, Impasses, Strikes and Resolutions,
in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS 101, 112 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972).
35. See McKelvey, Factfindingin Public Employment Disputes: Promise or Illusion?, 22 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 528, 543 (1969).
36. See note 25 supra.
37. DEPT. OF LABOR, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE STATEOF-THE-ART 57 (1972). Because mediation and factfinding are consecutive processes,
it is difficult to ascertain, after the fact, which process was most instrumental in
achieving settlement.
38. See Note, supra note 6, at 449.
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The most attractive feature of factfinding as a mechanism to facilitate dispute resolution is its success in resolving disputes short of strike
in the public sector generally. 3 9 There are, however, three shortcomings of an impasse resolution mechanism employing mediation followed by factfinding. First, the processes are dependent upon voluntary settlement of complex bargaining issues. If the bargaining representatives are inexperienced in effectively utilizing the resolution procedures, settlement may not result from either mediation or factfinding, and the possibility of a strike will be presented. 40 Depending on
the public service involved, an interruption may or may not be tolerable. 4 1 A second problem of mediation-factfinding is the possible
failure of the members of the represented group to ratify the bargaining representative's acceptance of a factfinder's recommendations:
because the recommendations are not binding on the disputants, there
is no assurance that they will, even if accepted, be implemented by the
parties. 42 Finally, mediation and factfinding are inadequate to stimulate good faith negotiations because neither procedure imposes suffi43
cient social and economic costs upon the disputants.
The most serious deficiency of the EERA, however, is that the mediation-factfinding impasse resolution mechanism, as a purely voluntary procedure, is an inadequate alternative to the strike power. 44 The
authorization of voluntary settlement procedures as alternatives to
those provided for in the Act 45 is commendable. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that the parties to a negotiations impasse will mutually agree
to submit the dispute to, for example, binding arbitration, in view of
the continued availability to the employer of anti-strike injunctions.
39.

See

DEPT. OF LABOR, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE STATE-

OF-THE-ART 60 (1972), and sources cited therein.

40. Cf. Zack, supra note 34, at 113.
41. See Part II-B-3 infra.
42. See note 25 supra.
43. A strike by the public employee group places the cost of the disagreement on
both disputants. The employer may anticipate public pressure as a result of the interruption of services that he is expected to provide. The employee, on the other hand,
must anticipate at least a temporary lowering of his income. Neither mediation nor
factfinding impose such social and economic pressures.
44. The shortcomings of statutes employing mediation-factfinding resolution procedures are succinctly stated in Lev, supra note 22, at 774:
In the main, the statutes have not worked because they merely postpone the
eventual strike confrontation by creating factfinding commissions or compulsory
arbitration tribunals in which the employees have no trust. All contain pious
statements about the virtues of good faith bargaining which barely conceal the
real legislative hope that the problems will disappear.
45. Ch. 288, § 13(5), [1975] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1235.
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Obtaining an injunction against a threatened strike would not only be
more advantageous to the district from the standpoint of time and
convenience, but would also allow it to avoid the problems typically
associated with binding arbitration in public employment negotia46
tions.
If a balance is to be achieved between the bargaining positions of
school districts and teachers, it would be advisable to allow the teachers' representatives to unilaterally select binding arbitration as the
mode of dispute settlement. Such an approach would eliminate the
control, reinforced by the anti-strike injunction, currently exercised by
districts in setting wages, hours, and working conditions47 and yet
provide a viable alternative to the strike power. Inasmuch as the
EERA allows, but does not require, such a resolution process, it does
not supply an adequate substitute for the strike power. The absence in
the EERA of an adequate quid pro quo for restraint in exercise of the
strike power may cause teachers to continue to rely on the threat of
strike48 to buttress their collective bargaining position. Consequently,
the judicial role in resolving disputes that remain unresolved by the
Act's impasse procedures will continue undiminished.
III.

THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKE PROHIBITION IN
WASHINGTON

A.

The Problem-Portof Seattle

In the absence of dispositive impasse resolution procedures, school
boards typically have invoked the equity powers of the judicial system
to avoid the potentially harmful effects of collective work stoppages
46. Various criticisms of arbitration as a settlement mechanism have been made:
(1) availability of the arbitral process may have a chilling impact upon preliminary
negotiations; (2) arbitration arguably constitutes an impermissible delegation of legislative discretion; (3) in anticipation of a compromise solution, the parties may adopt
extreme positions during initial bargaining efforts. See Note, supra note 6, at 460-63.

47. See Zack, Dispute Settlement in the Public Sector, 14 N.Y.L.F. 249, 268
(1968). Even with the strike option, teachers are at a substantial bargaining dis-

advantage in light of the ready availability of anti-strike injunctions. Although violation of injunctions by teachers' groups usually results in the issuance of contempt citations, final settlements often contain amnesty agreements exculpating violators of the
injunction. Nevertheless, the possibility of substantial fines for contempt (in the event
that the court ignores the amnesty agreement) exerts pressure on the teachers' bargaining agents, causing them to moderate their demands.
48. The EERA neither expressly permits nor prohibits strikes by public schoolteachers. See note 71 infra.
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by certificated teachers. In Port of Seattle v. InternationalLongshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,49 the court stated that "the primary
reason for the modern day vitality of the principle that the government is immune to strikes is to safeguard and protect public health
and safety." 50 Following this decision, Washington courts have, with
one exception, held that strikes by certificated teachers are intolera52
ble. 5 1 Port of Seattle originated when plaintiff municipal corporation
sought to enjoin defendant union from striking and picketing. The

trial court concluded that the threatened strike was illegal, and enjoined it because the port was suffering "immediate, substantial, and
irreparable loss and damage." 53 On appeal, the court rejected the un-

ion's argument that the maintenance of the port was merely a proprietary function of the municipality, and that as such the traditional gov-

ernmental strike immunity should not preclude a strike by port employees against proprietary activities. 54 Although justifying the public
employer's strike immunity as necessary to protect public health and
safety, 55 the court deemed itself unable to accurately determine the
effect on public health and safety of a strike against a particular municipal function. It asserted that the legislature should make that de49. 52 Wn. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958).
50. Id. at 322, 324 P.2d at 1102.
51. The exception is Clover Park School Dist. 400 v. Clover Park Educ. Ass'n,
No. 238548 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16, 1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 83-88 infra. In most cases prior to Clover Park, the courts did
more than issue an injunction against the strike. In addition, judges often attempted
to minimize the teachers' reduction in bargaining power by invoking WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.40.070 (1974) (allowing the court to impose terms and conditions upon party obtaining injunction), requiring the parties to submit the dispute to mediation as a
condition to the issuance of a permanent injunction.
52. That school districts are municipal or quasi-municipal corporations was reaffirmed in Noe v. Edmonds School Dist. 15, 83 Wn. 2d 97, 515 P.2d 977 (1973)
(upholding school board's discretionary power to discipline teachers).
53. 52 Wn. 2d 317, 319, 324 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1958). Although the state supreme
court upheld the injunction despite the absence of evidence in the trial court record
regarding the strike's effect on the public health and safety, it is important to note
that the injunction was proper only because "the resultant damage to the port" was
substantial. Id. at 323, 324 P.2d at 1103 (emphasis added). The court's use of that
language raises the question of whether the court simply presumed harm to the public
health and safety as a result of the strike and used "damage to the port" as a justification for the desired result. In light of the skeletal record below, the conclusion
seems inescapable that the Port of Seattle decision necessarily rested on the assumption
that, as a matter of public policy, a strike by port workers could not be tolerated.
54. Brief for Appellant at 17-18, Port of Seattle, 52 Wn. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099
(1958). The court indicated that the distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions related primarily to the erosion of sovereign immunity in tort
law and declared the policy factors to be inapplicable to the case at hand. 52 Wn. 2d
at 320, 324 P.2d at 1101.
55. 52 Wn. 2d at 322, 324 P.2d at 1104.
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termination and address the complex public policy issues involved in
strikes against governmental employers. 56 Accordingly, the court concluded that in the absence of legislation extending the strike right to
public employees it was compelled to uphold the trial court's injunc7
tion.5
1.

Alternative interpretations

Although a broad interpretation of Port of Seattle warrants a per se
prohibition of all strikes by public employees, the facts of the case
militate strongly in favor of a more restrictive interpretation: only
those strikes that are potentially detrimental to the public health and
safety should be enjoined. Thus, Washington courts are potentially
confronted with two problems in strike injunction cases. First, a court
must determine whether Port of Seattle prohibits all strikes by public
employees or only those strikes adversely affecting the public health
and safety. Second, if the court accepts the latter interpretation, it
must ascertain whether the school district's showing of harm is sufficient to justify injunctive relief under the Port of Seattle requirements,
that is, whether the strike constitutes a threat to the public health and
safety. The second problem is particularly complex in the case of a
teachers' strike because the injuries alleged by school district officials
58
in support of petitions for injunction are generally intangible.
Trial courts have not utilized this two-part analysis when deciding
teacher strike injunction suits simply because they have interpreted
Port of Seattle too broadly. Once it is assumed that that case dictates a
blanket prohibition of strikes by public employees, it follows as a
matter of course that an injunction must be issued in every case. 59
Such a truncated approach does not give adequate deference to the
relative equities of the parties, nor does it require the complainant
school district to provide the degree of proof typically required to
60
support a petition for injunctive relief.
56. Id. at 323, 324 P.2d at 1103.
57. Id.
58. See Mead School Dist. 354 v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wn. 2d 140, 530 P.2d
302 (1975) (teachers' strike "disrupting" the operations of the school district and
"dislocating" the plans of students and parents held not to create an "emergency"
under the language of the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971).
59. See text accompanying notes 75-79 infra.
60. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text infra.
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Port of Seattle's progeny
Although the court in Port of Seattle correctly concluded that the

modern justification for governmental strike immunity is protection of
the public health and safety, such protection does not require a per se
prohibition of public employee strikes, 6 1 nor can a judicially-formulated prohibition of these strikes be justified by the ambiguous language of Port of Seattle.62 To expand governmental immunity beyond
situations where a threat to the public health and safety exists and judicially prohibit all public employee strikes has the same effect as
"legislating" against those strikes, a function that the Port of Seattle
63
court expressly disclaimed.
Unfortunately, the Washington Supreme Court has perpetuated the
uncertainty it created in Port of Seattle. At issue in Roza Irrigation
District v. State64 was whether the statute governing collective bargaining for general public employees 65 applies to the employees of ir-

rigation districts, a question the court unanimously answered in the
affirmative. 66 In dictum, however, citing only Port of Seattle for au-

thority, Justice Rosellini stated for the court: "The legislature must
have been aware that this court had held that public employees, while
they have the right to organize, do not have the right to strike."67 The
Roza court thus interpreted Port of Seattle as having established a per
se rule against strikes by public employees.
Two years after Roza the court buttressed the argument for a
public health and safety limitation on the prohibition of public employee strikes. In Operating Engineers Local 286 v. Sand Point
61.
See Parts III-B-2 & -3 infra.
62. The Washington Supreme Court has never expressly or implicitly held that
public employee strikes are illegal. In Port of Seattle the court held only that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion when he enjoined the strike by longshoremen.
52 Wn. 2d at 323, 324 P.2d at 1103. See Clover Park School Dist. 400 v. Clover Park
Educ. Ass'n, No. 238548, at 14 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16, 1975).
63. 52 Wn. 2d at 323, 324 P.2d at 1103. Regarding the hazards of judicial legislation in the field of labor law see Peck, Judicial Creativity and State Labor Law,
40 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1965).
64. 80 Wn. 2d 633, 497 P.2d 166 (1972).
65. The statute under consideration in Roza was WASH. REV. CODE ch. 41.56
(1974), in which the legislature expressly disavowed any grant of the right to strike,
id. § 41.56.120, though it permitted public employees to organize, id. §§ 41.56.010 &
.040. However, teachers are not within the class of public employees covered by id.
ch. 41.56. See id. § 41.56.020, the Reviser's Note which follows it, and sections crossreferenced therein; Roza, 80 Wn. 2d at 640, 497 P.2d at 170.
66. 80 Wn. 2d at 640, 497 P.2d at 170.
67. Id. at 638, 497 P.2d at 169 (emphasis added).
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Country Club,68 Justice Rosellini, again writing for the majority and
69
again in dictum, stated:
In 1967, after this court had handed down its decision in Port of Se-

attle

. .

.

holding that public employees may not strike if the public

health and safety are involved, the legislature enacted RCW 41.56,
governing public employees' collective bargaining, and imposing upon
the employer, in RCW 41.56.100, a duty of engaging in such bargaining. At the same time it expressly refrained from granting the
right to strike.
The stipulation that public employee strikes are unlawful if the public
health and safety are "involved" is perplexing. Most notably, the court
did not purport to establish a requirement that the public health and
safety be harmed before the strike is held impermissible. In virtually
all strikes, in the private as well as the public sector, the public health
and safety are affected to some degree. Taken at face value, then, the
application of such a broad standard to preclude strikes by public
employees is tantamount to a per se prohibition of public employee
strikes. As with the earlier decision in Port of Seattle, however, the
"involved" language of OperatingEngineers can be construed so that
it qualifies, rather than merely restates, the general prohibition.
Inasmuch as the grant of injunctive relief in Port of Seattle was
based on protection of the public health and safety, the involvement
of the public health and safety contemplated in OperatingEngineers
should be construed to mean that before a teachers' strike is enjoined,
the complainant must demonstrate specific potential harm to the
public health and safety. A requirement that the complainant merely
show "involvement" of the public health and safety would be equivalent to, and therefore subject to the same criticisms as, a judiciallyformulated per se strike prohibition.7 0 Unless injunctive relief in
teachers' strikes is predicated on a showing that the public health and
safety are suffering, or are about to suffer, substantial and irreparable
injury as a result of the strike, Washington trial courts must, largely
on the basis of a single ambiguous supreme court opinion, continue to

68. 83 Wn. 2d 498, 519 P.2d 985 (1974).
69. Id. at 502, 519 P.2d at 988 (emphasis added). See also note 65 supra. Operating Engineers involved the efforts of golf course maintenance workers to organize
and engage in collective bargaining.
70. See Parts III-B-2 & -3 infra. Cf. notes 15 & 16 supra.
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abdicate their traditional role in considering petitions for the injunc71
tion of teachers' strikes.
B.

Injunctive Relief in Certificated Teacher-Employee Strikes

1.

Standardfor injunctive reliefin Washington

Assuming that a trial court correctly decides that teachers' strikes
are not per se unlawful, the degree of proof necessary to justify the
issuance of an injunction is of crucial importance. In injunction suits
generally, the complainant must show that irreparable and substantial
injury is occuring or will occur in the near future if relief is not
granted7 2 and that other legal remedies are inadequate.7 3 In teachers'
strike cases, however, most Washington trial courts have required
71. The legislature's inability to resolve the politically volatile strike issue
coupled with the judicial ambiguity discussed in the text has left to the superior courts
the application of a discretionary standard without guiding criteria. The word "strike"
does not appear in the EERA, and the fate of predecessor proposals strongly suggests
that the inclusion of strike language was a primary reason for their demise. In view of
the absence of strike language in the new EERA, lower courts should no longer be
constrained by the legislature's inactivity and should reassess the meaning of Port of
Seattle in the context of teachers' strikes. See, e.g., Clover Park School Dist. 400 v.
Clover Park Educ. Ass'n, No. 238548, at 13-14 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County,
Sept. 16, 1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 83-88 infra.
72. Port of Seattle, 52 Wn. 2d at 319, 324 P.2d at 1100.
73. See note 78 infra. Evidence in support of the complaint usually consists of
affidavits, testimony or other verified statements by school board officials or teacher
representatives relating to the character and degree of the alleged impending harm.
Cf.WASH. REV. CODE § 7.40.060 (1974) (parties may read affidavits at a hearing on
injunction). Although the character and degree of harm requisite to invoke equity
powers of the court are in large measure left to the trial judge's discretion, id.
§ 7.40.020 (the general injunction statute) sets forth certain guidelines to which the
judge must conform when he makes that decision:
When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of some act, the commission or continuance of which during the
litigation would produce great injury to the plaintiff; or when during the litigation, it appears that the defendant is doing, or threatened, or is about to do, or is
procuring, or is suffering some act to be done in violation of the plaintiff's right
respecting the subject of the action tending to render the judgment ineffectual; or
where such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining proceedings upon
any final order or judgment, an injunction may be granted to restrain such act or
proceedings until the further order of the court, which may afterwards be dissolved or modified upon motion.
The statute's requirement that the activity, or threatened activity, complained of must
"produce great injury to the plaintiff" appears to be equivalent to Port of Seattle's
"actual and substantial" injury standard. It has long been established that injunctive
relief is an exceptional remedy, to be granted only in "a clear case of irreparable injury," and only when the court has no doubt as to the necessity of the remedy.
Morse v. O'Connell, 7 Wash. 117, 34 P. 426 (1893). See also Isthmian S.S. Co. v.

200

Educational Employment Relations Act
school districts to demonstrate little more than that a strike is imminent or in progress and that schools would be or are closed due to the
strike.7 4 This approach is similar to the application of a conclusive
presumption that teachers' strikes are per se harmful to the public
health and safety and therefore unlawful, and has the same practical
effect as a flat judicial prohibition.
The opinions of Washington superior courts in several recent teachers' strike injunction suits illustrate the application of this approach.
In both Tacoma School District 10 v. Tacoma Alliance of
Educators95 and Federal Way School District 210 v. Federal Way
Education Association7 6 the courts understandably found that if the
defendant teacher organization was allowed to implement its strike
plan the school district would not be able to operate its system effec77
tively and thereby provide an adequate education for students.
However, there was no evaluation of the nature of the alleged harm
that would be caused by a delay in the provision of educational services; rather than requiring the school district to demonstrate the
threat of substantial, immediate and irreparable injury in order to
obtain an injunction, the courts presumed that a delay in the opening
of school would cause harm to the students and parents sufficient to
warrant injunctive relief. In failing to look beyond the allegations of
substantial and irreparable harm in these cases, the courts failed to
National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 41 Wn. 2d 106, 247 P.2d 549 (1952), in

which the court stated:
Granting or withholding of a temporary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised according to the circumstances of the particular case .... That discretion must also be exercised within the bounds of established rules and principles of law.
Id. at 117, 247 P.2d at 556 (citation oriaittedJ.
74. See text accompanying notes 75-79 infra.
75. No. 229002 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 2, 1974) (oral opinion).
76. No. 784988 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County, Aug. 30, 1974) (oral opinion).
77. Id. But see Mead School Dist. 354 v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wn. 2d 140, 530
P.2d 302 (1975), in w hich the court held that a teachers' strike which disrupted the
operations of the school district and dislocated the plans of students and their parents
did not create an "emergency" within the meaning of the Open Meetings Act of 1971.
Hence, a resolution to initiate a suit seeking an injunction of the threatened teachers'
strike, adopted at a closed meeting, was invalidated.
The Tacoma and Federal Way opinions also suggest that a teachers' strike impedes

the district's constitutional obligation to provide ample educational opportunity for all
minors. See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
78.

Equitable factors to be considered by the trial court when deciding whether to

issue an injunction include:

(a) the character of the interest to be protected, (b) the relative adequacy to the

plaintiff of injunction in comparison with other remedies, (c) the delay, if any,
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give consideration to the relative equities of the litigants7 8 and exer79
cise the discretionary power characteristic of equity.
80
In contrast, the court in Mukilteo School District v. Thompson
found that a short delay in the opening of school would not cause specific harm to the school district. 81 Although the court enjoined the
threatened strike, it also ordered a two-day delay in the opening of
school and its order was predicated on protection of the school children and their parents. 8 2 The rationale of the opinion was a departure, albeit slight, from the presumption of harm approach taken in
earlier superior court decisions. The Mukilteo decision thus came
close to a recognition that allegations of intangible injury to the district by virtue of a short delay in the opening of school do not constitute an adequate showing of irreparable harm under the Port of Seattle standard for injunctive relief.
in bringing suit, (d) the misconduct of the plaintiff, if any, (e) the relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if an injunction is granted and to the
plaintiff if it is denied, (f) the interest of third persons and of the public, and
(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.
Homes Harbor Water Co. v. Page, 8 Wn. App. 600, 603, 508 P.2d 628, 630-31
(1973), citing Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn. 2d 402, 341 P.2d 499
(1959).
79. In United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959), Justice Douglas (dissenting) characterized the equity tradition as follows:
If [a] court is to be merely an automaton stamping the papers [a government
officer] presents, the judicial function rises to no higher level than an IBM machine. Those who grew up with equity and know its great history should never
tolerate that mechanical conception.
Id. at 71.
80. No. 124362 (Wash. Super. Ct., Snohomish County, Aug. 30, 1974) (oral
opinion).
81. Id. at 3. Presumably any interruption in an essential public service such as
police or fire protection could not be tolerated, regardless of the duration of the work
stoppage even under a narrow interpretation of Port of Seattle. The Mukilteo court's
suggestion that short-term teachers' strikes are not intolerable supports the view that
although teachers' services may be essential over the long run, they are nonessential
in the short run.
In Clover Park School Dist. 400 v. Clover Park Educ. Ass'n, Judge Morrison expressly recognized a distinction based on the essentiality of the public service involved:
Some public employees perform services that are so essential that they cannot
be discontinued for even a brief period of time without seriously threatening the
public health and safety. Teachers do not normally come under this category.
Although entrusted with a serious responsibility to a community, they do not
perform functions directly affecting the public health, safety or welfare. As a result, temporary disruption of their services do not generally have as serious an
effect on the public as, for example would the withholding of services by employees of fire and police departments, publicly-operated hospitals or municipallyowned utilities.
No. 238548, at 15 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16, 1975).
82. No. 124362, at 4 (Wash. Super. Ct., Snohomish County, Aug. 30, 1974)
(oral opinion).
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Finally, in Clover ParkSchool District400 v. Clover ParkEducation
Association,8 3 the superior court held that a school district seeking
injunction of a teachers' strike must demonstrate "that the public'
health and safety is being seriously threatened, that the district would
be irreparably harmed and that the district was not a contributor to
the cause of the strike, i.e. had clean hands."'8 4 The court pointed to
the availability of make-up time, the year-round operation of other
school districts with no apparent adverse effects and the "dirty hands" 85
of the district in finding that there had been no showing of substantial and irreparable harm resulting from the strike. 86 As in Mukilteo,
however, the court qualified its position and noted that the strike situation was highly undesirable and that if the strike continued "for
87
many more days" irreparable harm might result.
The approach employed by the Mukilteo and Clover Park courts is
preferable to that of earlier Washington cases from an equity standpoint because it focuses on balancing the competing interests of the
litigants.8 8 Moreover, if the grant or denial of injunctive relief bears a
direct relationship to the good faith bargaining efforts of the parties
during mediation and factfinding, the effectiveness of the impasse resolution mechanism provided by the EERA will be enhanced. The desirability of such an approach is reinforced by an examination of
teachers' strike cases in other jurisdictions.
2.

Proper treatment of teachers'strike injunctions in other
jurisdictions

A well-reasoned 89 minority 90 view has evolved as courts in other
jurisdictions conclude that injunctive relief from teachers' strikes
83. No. 238548 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16, 1975). In Clover Park
the school board and teachers' union had negotiated nearly six and one-half months
prior to the strike and the subsequent litigation.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id. at 3-10. The court outlined a pattern of behavior evidencing the school
district's failure to bargain in good faith and its efforts aimed at frustrating negotiations.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id.

88.

See note 78 supra.

89.

The rationales underlying the decisions discussed in this section of the text are

in substantial accord with the weight of scholarly authority regarding the public em-

ployee strike issue. See, e.g., Baldwin, Have Public Employees the Right to Strike?Yes, 30 NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 515 (1960); Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE LJ. 418 (1970); Foegen, A Quail-
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cannot be obtained merely on allegations that irreparable harm to
students and parents will result from short delays in school openings.
Initially, the Michigan Supreme Court in School District v. Holland
Education Association,9 1 held that a mere showing that the schools
would be unable to open as scheduled if a teachers' strike were not
enjoined was insufficient to support a petition for injunction. Interpreting a statute prohibiting strikes by public employees, the court
noted that it was contrary to the general policy of the state to issue
injunctions in labor disputes "absent a showing of violence, irrepar92
able injury, or breach of the peace."
Approving the Holland decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in School Committee v. Westerly Teachers Association,9 3 although
holding the teachers' strike in issue illegal, ordered the trial court to
review the pretrial negotiations and determine whether an injunction
should be issued.9 4 The decision was restricted to ex parte proceedings, but the court's conclusion that irreparable harm does not automatically result from the failure of schools to open as scheduled paral95
lels the conclusion reached by the Mukilteo and Clover Park courts.
fled Right to Strike-In the Public Interest, 18 LAB. L.J. 90 (1967); Kheel, Strikes
and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1969); Comment, Right of Public
Employees to Strike, 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 151 (1966); Comment, Prohibition Revisited: The Strike Ban in Public Employment, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 931: Note. supra
note 6; Note, Public Employee Labor Relations: Proposals for Change in Present State Legislation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 700 (1967). But see Anderson, Strikes and
Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943 (1969); Wellington
& Winter, More on Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE LJ. 441 (1970); Note,
A Critical Approach to the Traditional Prohibition of Teacher Strikes in Connecticut:
Is the Qualified Right to Strike a Viable Alternative?, 2 CONN. L. REV. 171 (1969).
90. In most cases, strikes by public school teachers have been enjoined. See, e.g.,
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. United Teachers-Los Angeles, 24 Cal. App. 3d 142,
100 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Ct. App. 1972); Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v.
Board of Pub. Instruction, 214 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1968); Anderson Fed'n of Teachers
v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 928 (1970); Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d
59 (1957); Board of Education v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 NJ. 29, 247 A.2d 867
(1968); Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E.2d 802, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625
(1968); School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, 101 R.I. 243, 221 A.2d 806
(1966); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d
624 (1958).
91. 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
92.
157 N.W.2dat 210.
93.
111 R.I. 96, 299 A.2d 441 (1973). At issue was the legality of strikes by
public educators and the validity of an ex parte restraining order that enjoined the
striking teachers and ordered them to return to work.
94. 299 A.2d at 446.
95. Compare the court's language in the Mukilteo dispute:
[W] hile there are certainly inconveniences ... to all concerned in an interruption
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Relying on Holland and Westerly, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in Timberlane Regional School Districtv. Timberlane Regional
Education Association96 upheld the trial court's denial of injunction of
an illegal teachers' strike,97 reasoning that mere automatic issuance of
the injunction would be detrimental to the collective bargaining
process.9 8 Asserting that judicial intervention should occur only when
alternative methods of dispute settlement have clearly failed, 9 9 the
court listed several factors to assist the trial court in identifying this
crucial phase. These factors include, inter alia, whether either agreedupon or statutory dispute settlement procedures have failed, whether
the parties to the dispute have negotiated in good faith, and whether
the public health, safety and welfare would be substantially impaired
by the continuance of the strike. 10 0 Though recognizing that it is improper for courts to comment on the propriety of granting public
employees the right to strike, the court justified its decision on the
basis of legislative inaction, stating that "courts are necessarily compelled to consider the problems inherent in labor relations between the
government and public employees when called upon to issue an injunction to prevent an illegal strike."'10 1
The Holland line of decisions represents a realistic view of the
courts' role in public employee dispute settlement. If judicial intervention is permitted only where the public health and safety will be substantially and irreparably harmed, the bargaining process will be less
influenced by the anticipation of court interference and good faith
or dislocation of schedules, to the administration, to the teachers themselves...

the function of schools and the reason for their existence is not for the convenience of the administration nor for the convenience of the instructional staff,
it is there for the purpose of the school patrons, primarily the children and of
course, indirectly their parents. If this [strike] did harm to them, that... justifies
the law ...that a public employees' strike is illegal.
No. 124362, at 4 (Wash. Super. Ct., Snohomish County, Aug. 30, 1974) (oral opinion), with Judge Morrison's statement in Clover Park:
This court will give assistance but only on terms which it considers, after hearing all the evidence, to be just to all the parties involved. The teachers have
rights as [do] all citizens. We are not concerned solely with the students, their
parents and the taxpayers. After all this is a court of justice not a club which
the board can use at will to beat its employees into submission as it here sought
to do.
No. 238548, at 13 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16, 1975).
96. 114 N.H. 245, 317 A.2d 555 (1974).
97. 317 A.2d at 559.
98. Id. at 558-59.
99. Id. at 559.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 558.
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participation during the initial stages of negotiation will be encouraged.1 02 At the same time, the public interest will be protected. 10 3 The
approach taken in Holland, Westerly, and Timberlane is consistent
with modern approaches to public employee dispute settlement and
04
should be adopted by the Washington courts.
3.

Protection of the public health and safety

The length of time that a teachers' strike can be tolerated depends
on the strike's impact upon the public health and safety. In strikes by
police, fire, or sanitation workers there is little dispute over whether
the strike will endanger the public health and safety; on the other
hand, there is usually little public furor when park maintenance
workers strike. However, the determination of when the public health
and safety is adversely affected is uniquely complex in the public education sector. Generally, the decision on alleged danger to the public
health and safety created by a teachers' strike is within the trial judge's
discretion; however, jurisdictions which permit a limited right to strike
often establish procedural guidelines to govern the issuance and scope
of injunctions in teachers' strikes. 10 5
In the strictest sense, teachers do not provide a service that is essential, i.e., one that directly affects the public health and safety.' 0 6 Nevertheless, there is a direct relationship between the continuing availability of public education and the public welfare. A teachers' strike
consequently may be tolerable for a certain length of time and yet
102. See Clover Park School Dist. 400 v. Clover Park Educ. Ass'n, No. 238548
(Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16, 1975). Speaking of the period following
his denial of injunctive relief, Judge Morrison stated:
During the three days following my decision more issues were settled than had
been settled in the six and one-half months of previous negotiations. The teachers
and the board agreed voluntarily that the teachers would return to work and the
parties would negotiate the remaining issues.
Letter to author, at 1, Sept. 22, 1975, on file at the offices of the Washington Law
Review.
103. See Part III-B-3 infra.
104. The approach suggested by the Holland line of cases was adopted by Judge
Morrison in Clover Park. The author suggests that future suits for injunctive relief
from teachers' strikes be accorded the same careful consideration given in Clover
Park, namely that of balancing the equities of the litigants to determine whether an
injunction should be issued.
105. See WOLLETT & CHANIN, supra note 13, at 6:136 & n.414, quoting Chanin,
Negotiation in Public Education: Developing a Legislative Framework 29-31 (Education Comm. of the States 1969).
106. See note 81 supra.
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become intolerably detrimental to the public interest as it is prolonged.' 0 7 Some commentators have indicated that teachers' strikes of
short duration should be tolerable because school districts are typically closed during holidays and summer vacations with no apparent
adverse affect on the public health or safety. 10 8 Moreover, school
schedules are usually sufficiently flexible to permit rescheduling to
compensate for time lost as a result of a teachers' strike. 109 Perhaps

the most likely pitfall for trial court judges faced with determining the
impact of a teachers' strike on the public health and safety is the
temptation to equate public or administrative inconvenience with
public detriment. If the inconvenience resulting from the strike is only
such as would be expected to accompany any strike, by private or
public employees, then clearly the strike should not be enjoined.
The "public" need not be viewed in the aggregate in determining
whether the harm is sufficient to warrant an injunction and what form

an injunction, if granted, should take. For example, one court granted
an injunction where a teachers' strike resulted in increased gang activity, the need for increased police protection, and an irreparable adverse educational impact on slower students."10 Where the strike has
107. This appeared to be the view of the Clover Park court. Judge Morrison's
admonition that if the strike continued "for many more days" evidences such a perspective of the harm caused by the strike. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
108. See Note, Striking a Balance in Bargainingwith Public School Teachers, 56
IOWA L. REv. 598, 610-11 (1971); WOLLETT &CHANIN, supra note 13, at 6:142.

In Clover Park School Dist. 400 v. Clover Park Educ. Ass'n, No. 238548 (Wash.
Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16, 1975), plaintiff school board's evidence indicated
that "there [was] a possibility that the school district [would] lose approximately
$54,000 per day for each day of the strike..... Id. at 10. The court minimized the
value of this contention by pointing out that by operating the schools during the
Christmas and spring vacations a potential of 21 make-up days were available. See also
Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Comwlth. 378, 291 A.2d
120 (1972) (holiday dates available, permitting school district to make up enough
instructional days to meet state subsidy requirement; teachers' strike therefore not a
clear and present danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the public).
One potential source of tangible injury to the school district is the expense of
employing janitorial, maintenance, and transportation personnel during the strike
period; however, in many instances such employees operate on an 11-month per year
contract and would be required to report to work on make-up days in any event. If
overtime pay were required during holiday periods being used to make up days lost
due to the strike, many of these services could be reduced in order to minimize the
cost to the district. Interview with Mr. William Radcliffe, Office of the Supt. of Public
Instruction of Washington, in Seattle, October 29, 1975.
109. See School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206
(1968); Timberlane Regional School Dist. v. Timberlane Regional Educ. Ass'n, 114
N.H. 245, 317 A.2d 555 (1974); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 111 R.I.
96, 299 A.2d 441 (1973); Clover Park School Dist. 400 v. Clover Park Educ. Ass'n,
No. 238548 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16, 1975).
110.
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an intolerably detrimental effect on a specific group of students, e.g.,
graduating seniors or special education pupils, it may be appropriate
to require only their teachers to return to the classroom.' 1 1
IV.

CONCLUSION

Enactment of the Education Employment Relations Act may reduce the frequency of teachers' strikes in Washington. However, the
lack of finality inherent in a mediation-factfinding impasse resolution
procedure casts doubt upon the effectiveness of the EERA in resolving
impasses where the disputants are highly polarized. Hence the judiciary's role in impasse resolution is likely to remain integral to the entire
process of collective bargaining in the education sector. The most equitable and practical approach for the courts to take is to encourage
"hard bargaining" under the EERA by enjoining teachers' strikes only
upon a clear showing that the strike in issue will cause immediate,
actual and substantial injury to the public health and safety. The resultant uncertainty of whether injunctive relief will be granted should
encourage good faith bargaining by the parties and persuade them to
fully utilize the Act's impasse procedures.
Certainly no general rule can be formulated for determining when a
teachers' strike will cause irreparable harm to the public health and
safety; that decision turns on the facts and circumstances of each case.
However, in exercising the full extent of their discretionary equity
powers, the courts can remain vigilant in protecting the public interest
without imposing an inequitable and unjustifiable per se strike prohibition upon public school teachers.
Richard Alcorn

RPTR.

6:142.

No. 498, col. F-I (1973), discussed in

WOLLETT & CHANIN,

supra note 13, at

111. It appears, however, that the strike must harm the students in a substantial
manner. See Clover Park School Dist. 400 v. Clover Park Educ. Ass'n. No. 238548.
at II (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 16, 1975) (disregarding plaintiff school
board's evidence that the school's football players were frustrated by the delay in the
opening of the football season caused by the teachers' strike).
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